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COAfAfONWEALTH~SCHULZE

In Commonwealth v. Schulze, 1 the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts overruled the lower court's decision and adjudged
that testimony by a general practitioner concerning a defendant's
mental condition was admissible. 2 Prior to this decision, Massachu
setts case law prohibited opinion testimony regarding a defendant's
lack of criminal responsibility from a person who was not specialized
in the treatment of mental diseases. 3 The court in Schulze, however,
addressed the issue of whether a general practitioner, who had ex
amined a defendant a few days prior to a crime, could testify as to
his observation and diagnosis of the defendant's mental condition at
the time of treatment. 4 Based on the facts in Schulze, the court con
cluded that exclusion of a general practitioner's testimony consti
tuted reversible error. 5 The court's holding on this issue broadens
the scope of admissible evidence allowed in a criminal trial where
insanity is raised as a defense. 6
In 1982, Mark Schulze appealed his conviction of armed rob
bery on the ground that the trial judge's exclusion of the testimony
by a general practitioner, Dr. Chin, amounted to prejudicial error.7
Defendant Schulze claimed that he was in a state of acute toxic psy
chosis, caused by a heroin overdose, when he attempted an armed
robbery of a Somerville pharmacy.s Thus, his sole defense was that
he lacked criminal responsibility.9
I. 389 Mass. 735, 452 N.E.2d 216 (1983).
2. fd.
3. fd. at 738-39, 452 N.E.2d at 219-20. See Commonwealth v. Boyd, 367 Mass.

169, 182, 326 N.E.2d 320, 328-29 (1975) (defines the longstanding rule on expert testi
mony in Massachusetts).
4. Schulze, 389 Mass. at 739-40, 452 N.E.2d at 220.
5. fd. at 742, 452 N.E.2d at 221.
6.

fd.

7. fd. at 736, 452 N.E.2d at 218. The defendant also contended that if the offer of
proof was deficient then he was thereby denied effective assistance of counsel. fd. at 738,
452 N.E.2d at 219.
8. fd. at 736, 452 N.E.2d at 218.
9. fd. See Commonwealth v. McHoul, 352 Mass. 544, 549-53, 226 N.E.2d 556,
559-62 (1967). In McHoul, the court applied the Model Penal Code approach to the
definition of criminal responsibility:
Section 4.01 Mental Disease or Defect Excluding Responsibility (1) A person is
not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct as a result of
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The defense presented a qualified psychiatrist who confirmed
that the defendant suffered chronic characterological depression and,
that at the time of the robbery, the defendant was in an acute toxic
psychosis. \0 In addition to the psychiatrist's testimony, the defense
attempted to introduce evidence from Dr. Stanley Chin, a licensed
general practitioner who had examined the defendant during the
week before the robbery attempt. ll It was this testimony which the
trial court found inadmissible. l2 Chin examined Schulze on Septem
ber 7th and l3th, 1979 and concluded that he was depressed and had
manic tendencies. Schulze was advised to seek a psychiatric consul
tation. 13 Although this evidence was relevant, the major issue ad
dressed was whether such testimony was admissible. 14
The Massachusetts appellate court adhered to the established
Commonwealth rule that a non-specialist witness was prohibited
from giving an opinion, based on either hypothetical circumstances
or personal observation, regarding a defendant's mental condition at
a time, prior to, or during a crime. 15 The court stated that "while
most other jurisdictions permit lay witnesses to state his or her opin
ions as to a person's mental condition, 'such opinion is severly cir
cumscribed in Massachusetts.' Thus, the general rule in
Massachusetts is that persons who do not qualify as experts in
mental illness may testify only as to facts observed and may not tes
tify as to their opinions with respect to the mental condition of
another."l6
The justification for this rule was thoroughly analyzed in the
mental disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the
criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements oflaw.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
10. Schulze, 389 Mass. at 736, 452 N.E.2d at 218.
II. Id. at 736, 452 N.E.2d at 219.
12. Id. at 737, 452 N.E.2d at 219. The final offer of proof at trial was that Dr. Chin
had prescribed Valium on two occasions. The supreme judicial court, however, found
such a limited view of the offer of proof unwarranted because the defense counsel had
indicated earlier that Dr. Chin would testify as to the defendant's "state those four or five
days before." Id.
13. Id. at 738, 452 N.E.2d at 219.
14. /d. at 742, 452 N.E.2d at 221.
15. Commonwealth v. Schulze, 14 Mass. App. Ct. 343, 346-47, 439 N.E.2d 826, 829
(1982). Cf. Commonwealth v. Spencer, 212 Mass. 438, 99 N.E. 266 (1912). In Spencer
the court called for a relaxation of the settled rule and allowed a family physician to give
an opinion of a testator's sanity. The case involved the execution of a will by a person
whose mental capacity was in question. Id.
16. Schulze, 14 Mass. App. Ct. at 346-47, 439 N.E.2d at 829 (quoting P. LIACOS,
HANDBOOK OF MASSACHUSETTS EVIDENCE 102 (5th ed. 1981).
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Massachusetts case, Commonwealth v. BoydY In Boyd, the court
stated that a trial judge should determine whether a witness is quali
fied to offer an expert opinion on mental illness by assessing whether
he or she has sufficient knowledge, special skills and expertise in this
area. IS A review of the trial transcript by the supreme judicial court
in Schulze confirmed that the judge had disallowed testimony of the
defendant's mental condition because the doctor/witness was a gen
eral practitioner and consequently, under the Massachusetts rule,
unqualified to express an opinion on the issue. 19 The supreme judi
cial court reversed the lower courts' strict adherence to the long
standing general principle and formulated a new approach. When
insanity is raised as a defense, a general practitioner who has ex
amined a defendant, may now testify about the defendant's mental
condition. 20
The new rule reflects the prevailing view in other jurisdictions
where a similar standard of criminal responsibility is applied. 21 This
view is founded upon the conclusion that when criminal responsibil
ity is at issue, evidence of a defendant's conduct and appearance,
before or after the crime, are matters for the jury to decide. Addi
tionally, if a physician is qualified to diagnose and prescribe treat
ment for a defendant, then the physican should be allowed to testify
concerning these conditions. 22
After applying the newly adopted rule and concluding that Dr.
Chin's testimony was admissible, the court was required to deter
mine whether the exclusion of the evidence constituted reversible er
ror. 23 Under Massachusetts' law, if the consumption of drugs causes
a mental disease or defect apart from an addiction itself, a defendant
may rely upon that mental disease or defect to support an assertion
17. 367 Mass. 169,326 N.E.2d 320 (1975).
18. Id. at 182, 326 N.E.2d at 328.
19. Schulze, 389 Mass. at 737, 452 N.E.2d at 219.
20. Id. at 738, 452 N.E.2d at 219-20. The supreme judicial court, however, noted
in a footnote that the appeals court should not be faulted for adhering to the old rule on
the subject. Id. at 740 n.4, 452 N.E.2d at 220 n.4.
21. /d. at 740, 452 N.E.2d at 220. Other jurisdictions mentioned by the court in
Schulze apply substantially the same standard of criminal responsibility as Massachu
setts does, i.e., Model Penal Code approach. See, e.g., United States v. Hartfield, 513
F.2d 254 (9th Cir. 1975); United States v. Smith, 507 F.2d 710 (4th Cir. 1974).
22. Schulze, 389 Mass. at 740, 452 N.E.2d at 220. This "new" approach adopted
by the supreme judicial court only relates to a general practitioner as a witness. The
expansion of the rule does not allow a general practitioner to offer an opinion on a de
fendant's criminal responsibility at the time of the crime. Id.
23. Id. at 741, 452 N.E.2d at 221.
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of lack of criminal responsibility.24 The court reasoned that Dr.
Chin's testimony may have had a tendency to support the psychia
trist's testimony regarding the issue of the defendant's chronic de
pression. 25 Although the psychiatrist's opinion as to the defendant's
criminal responsibility was based upon the acute toxic psychosis
caused by the heroin overdose, the jury potentially could have con
sidered an alternate theory, i.e., severe chronic depression. 26 There
fore, exclusion of Dr. Chin's testimony, which if admitted might
have substantially affected the jury's evaluation of the defendant's
culpability, significantly weakened the defendant's case.27 Thus, the
judgments against Schulze were reversed, and a new trial ordered. 28
The supreme judicial court's decision in Schulze significantly
expands the scope of testimony admissible when criminal responsi
bility is at issue. The court now allows opinion testimony on a de
fendant's mental condition by a non-specialist/general practitioner
who has examined a defendant within a reasonable time prior to or
after the happening of a crime. 29 A defendant's conduct and appear
ance prior to a crime are factors for the jury to consider. Based on
this premise, the new rule applied in Schulze allows a more thorough
and complete assessment of a criminal defendant's mental condition.
Robin L. Oaks

24. See Commonwealth v. Sheehan, 376 Mass. 765, 769, 383 N.E.2d 1115, 1118
(1978) (established the rules which relate to drug use and criminal responsibility).
25. Schulze, 389 Mass. at 742, 452 N.E.2d at 221-22.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 740, 452 N.E.2d at 220. The new rule, however, does not go as far as
other jurisdictions in which opinions as to a person's mental condition may be received
from a lay witness who has had adequate opportunity to observe the defendant. See
Underwood v. State, 553 S.W.2d 869 (Mo. App. 1977); Smith v. State, 502 S.W.2d 814
(Tex. Crim. 1973).

